

Page 3 1 HEARING re Omnibus Hearing 2 HEARING re Amended Notice of Agenda for Hearing to be Held 3 November 30, 2023 at 11:00 a.m. (Prevailing Eastern Time) 4 5 (related document(s) 906, 987) 6 7 HEARING re Doc. #906 Motion to Approve Compromise / Genesis 8 Debtors Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 9 Procedure 9019(a) for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement 10 Agreement with the Joint Liquidators of Three Arrows 11 Capital, Ltd. [REDACTED] (related document(s) 905) 12 13 Adversary proceeding: 23-01190-shl Genesis Global Capital, 14 LLC v. Asquith 15 HEARING re Doc. #2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction or 16 Order Extending Automatic Stay to Non-Debtor Filed on Behalf 17 of Genesis Global Capital, LLC 18 19 HEARING re Doc. #3 (Seal) Motion to File Under Seal Certain 20 Portions of (A) Motion for (I) Preliminary Injunction or 21 (II) Order Extending Automatic Stay to Non-Debtors, (B) The 22 Accompanying Memorandum of Law, (C) The Accompanying 23 Declaration, and (D) The Accompanying Adversary Complaint 24 25 Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde

	Page 4
1	APPEARANCES:
2	
3	CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN HAMILTON, LLP
4	Attorneys for Debtors
5	One Liberty Plaza
6	New York, NY 10006
7	
8	BY: LUKE BAREFOOT
9	
10	WHITE & CASE LLP
11	Attorneys for Official Committee
12	1221 Avenue of the Americas
13	New York, NY 10020
14	
15	BY: COLIN WEST
16	PHILLIP ABELSON
17	
18	PROSKAUER ROSE LLP
19	Attorneys for Ad Hoc Group of Genesis Lenders
20	Eleven Times Square
21	New York, NY 10036
22	
23	BY: JORDAN SAZANT
24	
25	

	Page 5
1	HUGHES HUBBARD REED LLP
2	Attorneys for Gemini Trust Company, LLC
3	One Battery Park Plaza
4	New York, NY 10004
5	
6	BY: ERIN DIERS
7	
8	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
9	Attorneys for the U.S. Trustee
10	201 Varick Street, Suite 1006
11	New York, NY 10014
12	
13	BY: GREGORY ZIPES
14	
15	WEIL GOTSHAL MANGES LLP
16	Attorneys for Digital Currency Group, Inc.
17	767 Fifth Avenue
18	New York, NY 10153
19	
20	BY: JESSICA LIOU
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

	Page 6
1	CHARTWELL LAW
2	Attorney for Eric Asquith
3	170 Worcester Street, Suite 200
4	Wellesley, MA 02418
5	
6	BY: DAVID RICH
7	
8	LATHAM WATKINS
9	Attorney for Joint Liquidators of Three Arrows Capital
10	1271 Avenue of the Americas
11	New York, NY 10020
12	
13	BY: ADAM J. GOLDBERG
14	
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PROCEEDINGS THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Sean Lane in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. And we are here this morning for the Genesis Global Holdco case as well as for an adversary proceeding, Genesis Global -- well, an adversary proceeding that is contained within a motion that's on for today. let me start by getting appearances, first from debtor's counsel. MR. BAREFOOT: Good morning, Your Honor, Luke Barefoot from Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton for the debtors. THE COURT: Good morning. And on behalf of the official committee of unsecured creditors? MR. WEST: Good morning, Your Honor, Colin West of White and Case on behalf of the official committee. And I'm joined today by my partner, Phil Abelson. THE COURT: All right, good morning. And let me find out who's here on behalf of the ad hoc group of claimants.

MR. SAZANT: Good morning, Your Honor, Jordan
Sazant of Proskauer Rose on behalf of the ad hoc group of
Genesis lenders.

THE COURT: All right. And given the matters that are on for today, let me find out who might be here for the

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Page 8 1 liquidators of Three Arrows Capital. 2 MR. GOLDBERG: Good morning, Your Honor, Adam 3 Goldberg of Latham Watkins on behalf of the joint liquidators of Three Arrows Capital. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. And in connection with the 6 Adversary Proceeding 23-1190, who might be here for 7 defendant, Eric Asquith? 8 MR. RICH: Yes, Your Honor. Sorry, let me get my 9 video started up here. Yes, Your Honor, David Rich on 10 behalf of Eric Asquith. Thank you. 11 THE COURT: All right, good morning. And on 12 behalf of the Gemini Trust Company. 13 MS. DIERS: Good morning, Erin Diers, Hughes 14 Hubbard Reed on behalf of Gemini Trust Company. 15 THE COURT: All right, good morning. So I know 16 that, as I always say, there's many, many pages of 17 appearances here and I know lots of folks are here to listen 18 in for today. So at this point, I'll throw it open to any 19 other appearances for folks who have not yet done so who 20 expect that they may speak at today's hearing. And 21 obviously, to the extent that someone doesn't make an 22 appearance because they don't expect to speak and that 23 changes, you can enter your appearance at that time. But 24 anyone else that needs to make an appearance? 25 MS. LIOU: Good morning, Your Honor, Jessica Liou

from Weil Gotshal Manges on behalf of Digital Currency
Group.

THE COURT: All right, good morning. Anyone else?

All right. With that, I will turn it over to the debtors

and I note that we have an agenda that was filed on the

docket. So, counsel, it's to you.

MR. BAREFOOT: Thank you, Your Honor, Luke

Barefoot from Cleary Gottlieb for the debtors. Your Honor,
as we noted -- as you noted, we did file an amended agenda

at Docket Item 1001. There are two items on the agenda for
today's proceedings. The first is the 9019 motion for
approval of the settlement with Three Arrows Capital. That
is proceeding on an uncontested basis. And the second
matter is the motion for a preliminary injunction in the
Asquith adversary proceeding, which is proceeding on a
contested basis.

Subject to Your Honor's preferences, I propose to take those matters in that order.

THE COURT: That would be just fine. Thank you.

MR. BAREFOOT: Turning then, Your Honor, first to the Three Arrows Rule 1919 motion which was filed at Docket Item 906, by this motion, Your Honor, the debtors seek authorization for entry into and performance under a settlement agreement with the joint liquidators of Three Arrows Capital.

At the outset, Your Honor, we would like to, as an evidentiary matter, move into evidence the declaration of Mr. Tom Conheeny, who is a member of the special committee of the Board of Directors of Genesis Global Holdco LLC. And that declaration was attached to the Three Arrows' settlement motion at Exhibit C.

THE COURT: All right. Any objection by any party to the admission of that declaration as evidence in support of this matter? All right, hearing no response. I'm happy to receive that declaration as evidence. Thank you, counsel.

(Exhibit C entered into evidence)

MR. BAREFOOT: Very good, Your Honor. Turning then to the merits of the settlement, as the Court is aware, the debtors have been engaged in extensive litigation and motion practice with Three Arrows for more than five months in efforts to resolve the proofs of claim that were filed against the debtors' estates, which asserted in excess of \$1 billion in damages.

The proposed settlement resolves those claims in exchange for a single allowed claim against Genesis Global Capital in the amount of 33 million.

Very briefly, Your Honor, the special committee has determined and the debtors submit that the settlement is in the best interest of the debtors' estates and their

creditors and is well within the range of reasonableness.

And I'll just briefly go through a summary of some of the reasons that our motion sets out establishing that.

First, Your Honor, the settlement avoids significant risks and uncertainties, particularly where many of the claims and defenses were somewhat untested in the unique circumstances of the cryptocurrency industry. And that's particularly the case, Your Honor, where it resolves all of the motion practice between the parties including Three Arrows' lift stay motion that's about to have these claims finally adjudicated in alternative fora.

Second, Your Honor, the dollar amount of the settlement speaks for itself. Of the more than \$1 billion asserted, the \$33 million allowed claim amount represents approximately 3.3 percent of the asserted amount. And those figures are particularly important given the size of the asserted claim and the impact that it would have on potential distributions under a plan of reorganization if it were not resolved prior to effectiveness.

Third, Your Honor, resolving the claims on the terms of the proposed settlement avoids significant fees and expenses of counsel and expert witnesses that would be required given the fact-intensive nature of certain of the objections and the work that would be required to litigate those claims to a final judgment on the merits.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, Your Honor, while the settlement provides for a global resolution of the claims as between the Genesis debtors and Three Arrows

Capital, it expressly preserves any and all claims that the Genesis debtors have against their parent, DGC. So the debtors' claims that any liability associated with the Three Arrows Capital loans were assumed by DCG pursuant to the terms of the assumption and assignment agreement, are in no way compromised by the terms of the proposed settlement.

For these reasons and following extensive arm's length negotiations, the special committee has, in its business judgment, approved the settlement.

Before asking Your Honor to enter the order, I did want to briefly address three related matters. The first is the form of the revised proposed order. The second is the related sealing motion that was noted on the agenda and the third is the final form of the settlement agreement.

On first, Your Honor, the revised proposed order, you may have seen that the settlement agreement effectively contains two related but separate sets of settlement terms in a single document, one as between the debtors and Three Arrows Capital and one as between DCG and Three Arrows Capital. Following a series of conversations with the Office of the United States Trustee, the debtors agreed to clarify the language in the proposed order to make express

that the Court's approval of the settlement agreement apply only to the terms of the settlement agreement that concern the Genesis debtors and that the Court is in no way passing on or making any findings with respect to the terms as they pertain to DCG. That revised proposed order, together with the black line, was filed last week at Docket Item 966. There is one additional change that we have discussed with counsel for Three Arrows Capital and that we would propose to make to the revised proposed order. Very briefly, Your Honor, in Paragraph 4, it sets forth the --THE COURT: Hold on a second. There's somebody who's on the phone or doing something else and you need to mute your line because I can hear you, we can hear you, open mic moments are always a bad idea but never more so than when you're in court. So with that Mr. Barefoot, please resume. MR. BAREFOOT: I apologize, Your Honor. Do you have the revised proposed order in front of you? THE COURT: I haven't it. I've seen it. Where would it be in the -- I'm trying to think of where was it? Was in the binder or is it a separate stack? I think it's in the separate stack. MR. BAREFOOT: It should, I'm being told it should be Tab 3.

Tab 3. Okay. I know I've seen it.

THE COURT:

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So thank you for the reminder as to where I've seen it.

MR. BAREFOOT: Okay, very good, Your Honor. In addition to the changes that we made at the request of the Office of the United States Trustee, in Paragraph 4, which the first sentence of now reads "As set forth in the settlement agreement, the allowed 3AC claim against DGC is hereby allowed in the amount of \$33 million."

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BAREFOOT: We just revised that to include a clause that says "subject to occurrence of the settlement effective date." The reason for that, Your Honor, is that the settlement agreement only becomes effective not only upon Your Honor's approval but approval by the BBI court overseeing the Three Arrows liquidation. That approval is being sought but has not yet been obtained. So this change is just designed to make clear that the allowance of the claim will only occur once those conditions precedent to effectiveness of the settlement occur.

THE COURT: All right. That makes perfect sense.

Thank you for pointing that out.

MR. BAREFOOT: Okay, Your Honor, then I did want to briefly address and request entry of the order approving the debtor's sealing motion which was filed at Docket Item 905. Just very briefly, Your Honor, effectively, because as I mentioned, the terms of the settlement agreement do in

part relate to matters solely as between Three Arrows and DCG that are not relevant to this Court's approval, but that could be prejudicial to Three Arrows if they were fully disclosed given its ongoing litigations and negotiations with other creditors. The debtors have sought to seal those portions of the settlement agreement that do not relate to the Genesis debtors. So, subject to any questions Your Honor has, we would request entry of the order approving that sealing motion.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. So let me ask first if any party wishes to be heard on the 9019 motion itself, that is the settlement motion? And so let me just explicitly call out the committee given the committee's statutory role under the code. Anything from the committee?

MR. WEST: Yes, Your Honor, just very briefly. I just wanted to emphasize one aspect of the settlement agreement that was critical to the committee, critical to the committee's non-objection and belief that the settlement does fall within the range of reasonableness, that is the fact as Mr. Barefoot said that that there is no release whatsoever by the debtors or their related parties of DCG or any of its related parties of any claims. All such claims are expressly preserved. And of course, in the no deal posture that we are currently in, that is critical. So with that term in the settlement agreement, it was acceptable to

the committee. And that's all I had, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Any other party that wishes to be heard as to the settlement motion? And let me make sure to explicitly call out the Joint Liquidators of Three Arrows Capital if they have anything they wanted to add.

MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you, Your Honor, Adam Goldberg of Latham Watkins on behalf of the Joint Liquidators of Three Arrows Capital. We're pleased to be here before the Court today on the result of this dispute and appreciate everyone's time and effort with us. It was certainly a hard fought matter as you know, which I think goes to the support for the settlement as Mr. Barefoot explained to the Court. I rise virtually only to emphasize one additional reason in support of the motion to seal the settlement agreement, which is that in the BBI court, these matters would be sealed in that court as not accessible to the public in the same manner as in the United States. And so in the interest of comedy to the BBI proceeding, we would also suggest that the interests of comity support the sealing of the settlement agreement as it pertains to the Three Arrows - DCG matters and those interests of comity are relevant based on the recognition of the BBI proceeding in in our Chapter 11 case.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. With

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that, any other party that wishes to be heard on the 9019 motion? All right, hearing no further responses, I am happy to grant the motion seeking to approve the settlement. And I find that it is reasonable and satisfies all the requirements of Rule 9019 and applicable law. That includes the factors in the Second Circuit that should be applied when determining whether the settlement is fair and equitable as set forth in the Iridium case and laid out in the papers filed by the debtors here. And as the case law says, where most of all the factors are satisfied, the settlement should be approved and that the business judgment of the debtor in recommending the settlement should be factored into the Court's analysis. And this is also true of the advice and counsel and thoughts of the parties to the settlement and the professionals.

In short, this is a very reasonable settlement.

When you apply the factors here to the settlement, there

definitely was the prospect of the claims here as well as

the claims, similar claims involving FTX to really eclipse

the debtor's ability to actually move the case forward.

Obviously, it's in the interest -- if there's one thing that

parties can agree upon, it's their interest and desire to

move the case forward expeditiously for the benefit of all

stakeholders. And in addition, given the actual value of

the settlement and all the other considerations identified

by counsel, I'm happy to approve it.

As for the sealing motion, let me ask if any other party wishes to be heard as to the motion to seal? I did hear counsel for the joint liquidators on that point.

Anyone else who wanted to weigh in on the sealing motion?

MR. ZIPES: Your Honor, Greg Zipes with the US

Trustee's Office. My office would just ask that the order

stands on its merits. But the statement about comity, my

office doesn't necessarily agree with that statement. So we

would ask that there not be that additional language in

order to extent the parties are contemplating it.

THE COURT: Well I don't think anyone would disagree with the fact that the proceedings, those proceedings that are foreign proceedings don't have the same transparency requirements as these proceedings. And to the extent that there's a settlement involving parties that aren't the Genesis debtors, I think the idea is that this case shouldn't serve as a vehicle to publicize information about settlement not involving the debtors where those details about the settlement wouldn't be public in that foreign court. And I don't hear any or I didn't see anything that gave me any reason to believe anyone disputes that as sort of factual circumstance and context for making the sealing motion. Am I right about that? In other words, I don't necessarily -- I'm not interested in writing a

comity opinion under these circumstances. So let me allay any concerns that way. But it does seem that when we're talking about things that don't affect the debtor and that involve settlements between Three Arrows and other parties where those terms would not be public by virtue of the proceedings that Three Arrows has elsewhere, that they really shouldn't be made public by virtue of this proceeding. And so I don't know that anybody has made an argument that they should be simply by virtue of this proceeding. So I don't have a quibble with that because again, it doesn't affect these estates. And so, but I may be over overly complicating this Mr. Zipes. I just want to make sure I understand that I have the --

MR. ZIPES: Your Honor, I may be overly complicating it as well. So I'm just making this simple point that it's -- it doesn't need to be a part of the, I don't think it needs to be a finding of the Court.

I think it is, however -- so the, Rule 107(b) allows the court to direct the documents filed in connection with a motion be filed under seal. And it provides that a court may protect in any respect to a trade secret, confidential research development, or commercial information in 107(b). And so I think the factual circumstances here are relevant to making a finding of that because the idea is that this

information is confidential commercial information because it would not be publicized anywhere else. And I just want to make sure I understand that factual circumstance and that nobody disputes those factual circumstances.

All right. Hearing nothing, it seems to be pretty straightforward in the paper. So I think I don't need to parse exactly what flavor of legal theory I need to put to that. I'm understanding as to the factual circumstances that underlie the request to seal and under those circumstances, given those facts, I think it satisfies the requirements for sealing under 107(b).

I note there is no objection. I think there's no objection because it doesn't affect these estates. And I think counsel for Three Arrows Capital is just concerned about having collateral consequences that would somehow impact his client and parties and the BBI proceedings by -- in sort of a collateral way where they were -- it's something that can be avoided. So I find it's appropriate to seal the matters and I'll grant the motion to seal.

I do appreciate, given this conversation, the fact that parties are sensitive about the scope of the sealing.

And so I think the papers are very clear that it doesn't -it's nothing that affects the debtors, these estates and so therefore, there's no concern about the transparency because it's not affecting these estates.

So with that, thank you very much for the obvious work and care that went into identifying what the concern is and crafting an appropriate motion and proposed order to address that concern and no further. So with that, I'm happy to grant that motion. And so let me ask Mr. Barefoot, is there anything else to address on Roman numeral I of our agenda or should we move on to the adversary proceeding?

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, I believe that resolves everything under Roman numeral I and we will submit a revised, a revised proposed order on the settlement and the proposed order attached to the motion with regard to the sealing.

THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. All right. Next up is the motion for entry of a preliminary injunction or an order extending the automatic stay to a non-debtor. And so with that, it is the debtor's motion.

And so I'll hear from the debtor first. But before I do that, I just wanted to throw out a few thoughts that -- because these issues come up occasionally in cases and there are sometimes things that people are worried about where we can have a discussion and find an appropriate path forward.

My understanding, based on the veritable flurry of activity that's been going on in the case, is there's a desire to bring these cases to a conclusion promptly. There is a schedule actually that sets a confirmation hearing on

February 14th through 16th and it is, in fact, a plan that is seeking confirmation. It's a liquidation plan and then people are going to sue various people. And that's what it is. It's designed to be as straightforward as it can be, notwithstanding the fact that we may have to litigate certain issues.

I mentioned that because the automatic stay timing of it is important, right? So sometimes there are conversations about whether this stay should be extended where a case has just been filed and there's no endpoint in sight. And sometimes motions are filed and concerns are raised about preservation of evidence. And so my thought is here given the timing of the case and the fact that the automatic stay would end after the case is confirmed and the effective date, I didn't know if there was a discussion worth having about sort of preservation of evidence or any sort of representations that might allow the defendant to sort of see its way clear to sort of work something out in connection with the proposed relief. And I mentioned that because there are some things that are mentioned in the motion that are the kinds of traditional things that are mentioned in motions of this type, which are indemnification, obligations and, and burdens. And I have a whole -- it comes up enough that I have a whole folder, hard copy folder in my chambers that I take out from time to time

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So, so I'm happy to hear from the debtors first. But I'll just -- to the extent that there's anything worth talking about in terms of trying to move things along from the defendant's point of view, I at least wanted to throw that out there. So before we hear from Mr. Barefoot, is -again, I'm never in the room where people are discussing resolutions of these things and I don't know if there were any conversations or if so where of such conversations were left before we came in here today. So let me hear from counsel for the defendant whether it's worth having a discussion to try to head off a full blown argument on this motion from soup to nuts, but I'll be guided by comments.

Counsel?

MR. RICH: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Judge Lane. I appreciate it. David Rich on behalf of Eric Asquith. Eric is a consumer, also a lawyer, a former law partner of mine and a close friend. So I'm here on his behalf today. We certainly, if there's any way through the thicket, you know, we are certainly willing to explore that. You know we, I think, my partner who's working on this case with me, I think have spoken with counsel for the debtor, you know, to see if we could give them, you know, some certain time until January, you know, the end of January, some indeterminate time to try --

THE COURT: Well, you know, I mean -- so this is the way of handling it for I don't think January is going to do it in the sense of there's a -- that's why I mentioned the confirmation hearing. But one way to do this is sometimes people say, like Judge, we realize there's a confirmation scheduled, but we don't know if things are going to be delayed and we are not driving this bus. And so we want to reserve our rights, but if we have an opportunity to come back and, you know, in February, if the confirmation hearing is not going to happen at that point, and make our arguments at that point. Sometimes people do something like that. But again, I don't want to belabor this too much because it, at a certain point, it'll take longer than the argument will take. But maybe the thing to do is this. I'll ask you to think about it while I hear from Mr. Barefoot. And if there is a path forward, you can let me know when you respond to Mr. Barefoot.

MR. RICH: Sure.

THE COURT: But again, the cases are littered with some of these same things, talking about things like indemnification and the burden as well as the timing. You know extending an automatic stay of granting or this kind of injunction is not without limits. But again, we're in a better posture than a lot of other cases because we're not at the very beginning. And so there is some -- I think the

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idea is that there's an end in sight. So with that, Mr. Barefoot, let me turn it over to you to present your argument and we'll see where we end up.

MR. BAREFOOT: Thank you very much, Your Honor. Barefoot from Cleary Gotlieb for the debtors. brief in light of the extensive briefing and Your Honor's remarks on the record just now. But at base, Your Honor, the arbitration seeks a judgment on numerous causes of action including fraud concerning the operation of the Gemini Earn program. And while the arbitration has stayed as to the Genesis debtors, if it's permitted to continue at present, Gemini has made clear its intent to pursue discovery against the debtors, effectively seeking to establish its theories that to the extent there was any wrongdoing, it was by the debtors, not by Gemini. not speculative. Not only has Gemini served the debtors with document requests, but they have filed a statement in the adversary proceeding reiterating their intent to pursue that discovery.

Gemini is also asserted its rights under the indemnification provisions in the Gemini master loan agreements, which would be implicated if the arbitration were permitted to proceed to judgment. Moreover, as Your Honor outlined, this comes at a particularly critical time for the debtors on their path towards emergence, which was

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set in motion in a very concrete way by Your Honor's ruling on Tuesday to approve the disclosure statement.

The risks and downsides of the debtors and their limited remaining personnel being distracted by discovery in this arbitration to the detriment of all creditors, far outweigh any prejudice from a brief stay through effectiveness of a plan of reorganization. And, Your Honor, just finally this makes particularly sense where we're following confirmation and having clarity on the terms of distributions to Gemini Earn users, which as you've heard at the disclosure statement hearing and otherwise, could in some scenarios result in payment in full to those Gemini Earn users. That would, at minimum, narrow the scope of the claims and damages at issue in the arbitration.

Your Honor, I just did want to address one housekeeping matter. We had originally moved to seal certain references to the arbitration proceedings, given the confidentiality provisions applicable to those proceedings. Given that Mr. Asquith's opposition discloses in full and redacted terms the arbitral complaint, we think that sealing motion is moot and would intend to withdraw.

THE COURT: All right. One thing you could answer for me, Mr. Barefoot, is there's a reference in the papers at various points about various Gemini lenders have commenced or threatened to commence actions, class actions,

arbitration proceedings arising out of the Gemini Earn program. And I wanted to understand if those statements mean, as is often the case involving a debtor with extensive operations, that the proceeding in question is not necessarily a one-off meaning that whether there are other potential proceedings just like this that are likely. I see Mr. Asquith's counsel nodding yes, so I think I may have my answer, but other potential proceedings of this type that could be brought that would involve the debtors and raise the same issues?

MR. BAREFOOT: So, Your Honor, there certainly are a broad range of arbitration and other proceedings brought by Gemini Earn users. That said, none of those proceedings have gotten to this stage where we are proceeding towards a merits hearing that has necessitated Gemini pursuing the debtors to establish its defenses as to the claims that are being brought.

THE COURT: But let me ask this another way. A ruling denying your motion, would it raise the essentially come-one-come-all message to folks to say all these cases can go forward, placing the debtor in a position where they have to respond on multiple fronts if not now, someday soon?

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, I actually think it very well might. Conversely -- and I'd welcome Ms. Diers

Dear from Hughes Hubbard who is closer to some of these

arbitrations given that they have been proceeding as to nondebtor, Gemini. But many of the arbitrations have been stayed without the necessity of us obtaining an order from Your Honor. This particular arbitrator, when Gemini made the stay request, requested an order clarifying whether the automatic stay would be extended. So I think if the automatic stay extension motion were denied here, I think that would potentially have significant collateral consequences of having parties go back in the respective arbitrations and ask for those to proceed and necessitate Gemini pursuing discovery and other remedies against the debtors. I also think conversely, if this order were entered, it would similarly send a message to other arbitrators about how this would likely play out and allow parties to conduct themselves accordingly without burdening Your Honor's docket. THE COURT: All right. Well, again, the concern, well, obviously have some interest in not burning my docket. The question is whether it's going to burden the estate. And so -- but that's, I think I have my answer on that front. And so -- and I understand the indemnification really arises out of that Section 22(b) that's attached to that declaration of Jack Massey in support of the motion.

And so that seems to be fairly straightforward. Anything of

nuance or further to discuss the scope of the

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indemnification?

MR. BAREFOOT: I don't believe so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I guess last, but not least, I had made some comments at the outset about the timing of the automatic stay issues and that, you know, things aren't stayed forever. And anything you wanted to say on that on that front? I did see your paper said, you know, you're requesting this through the effective date. And so which I think sort of -- is a pre pretty clear statement about how you view the timing, but I just want to make sure there's nothing else you want to add on that topic.

MR. BAREFOOT: Your Honor, the only thing I'll add, I don't want to get into disclosing the settlement discussions that we attempted to have with Mr. Asquith's counsel before the opposition papers were filed. But the debtors would certainly be amenable if it will solve the objection, to limiting the request to the end of February for the time being without prejudice to our rights to seek to extend that if the effective date had not occurred by that point, or Mr. Asquith's rights to vacate that if other circumstances developed. We would make that offer now in open court, if that would resolve the opposition. But otherwise, our request would be through the effective date.

right. So let me hear from counsel from Mr. Asquith.

MR. RICH: Thank you, Judge Lane. And, yeah, I'm not sure I understand that. I want to make sure I understand the offer. Are you, I guess, are we -- is that an offer that the arbitration gets to go forward again if there's not a resolution as of February?

THE COURT: I think what it means is that people are going to decide not to fight about it now and the debtors are trying to move the case forward and hope to have things wrapped up on a timetable at which point the motion would be moot, but they recognize that nothing in life succeeds as planned. So if it doesn't work out that way, then you reserve your rights to come back to the court and we -- I'm happy to even set a date -- so that you get a -without filing -- frankly, what I would do is carry the motion so that nobody has to go to the expense of submitting additional papers. And everybody reserves their rights. So your cooperation would not be held against you. And it wouldn't be a comment on anything. It would be, well, I'm willing to work with you up to this point. And at that point, Judge, I may have to come back and take a different view.

MR. RICH: Yeah. Well, certainly, Judge, I am glad to be cooperative and want to, of course, make the Court and chambers' life, you know, as easy as possible.

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Certainly, I did not want to be a fly in the ointment and I'm not here today to create any chaos and certainly willing to work with opposing counsel. Quite frankly, I don't feel like what we've been offered has been reasonable. I will be honest, this was a prebankruptcy arbitration that we filed on behalf of Mr. Asquith, who's owed over a million dollars and so it's not an insignificant case. And, of course, the minute that Genesis declared bankruptcy, the automatic stay was in effect. We have not done anything related to them that would affect the estate or harm them or impact them in any way. And essentially, what's happened here is that Gemini has entered into consumer contracts with thousands, with tens of thousands of consumers, not just my client, but other ones. And they admit that these are valid contracts.

And so we filed the arbitration and they answered the complaint, Your Honor, and then they engaged in discovery. They produced documents. They agreed to make the Winklevosses available to me for deposition. And then all of a sudden what we heard is, well, now we want to stay because we're going to point the finger at the debtor. And we have a non-debtor pointing finger at a debtor trying to stop consumer arbitration and a contract. And there's thousands of these contracts that are valid, Your Honor.

I'm not going to be the last lawyer in front of you on this.

the resource issues as to the estate? Listen, I'm not here, nobody's asking me to decide this question about indemnification, but there is clearly an indemnification clause and Gemini is pointing the finger at the debtors. So the case law is pretty clear that when a lawsuit is -- it can be construed as even if the debtor isn't the named party as the party in interest, that that's a basis for granting this kind of relief. And I think that's why your efforts, while laudable to say, well, we'll drop the debtor, weren't seized upon by the debtors as an avenue to fix it because they said, well, it doesn't matter because Gemini is going to say, even if you are -- Mr. Asquith is not going after us, Gemini will go after us not only for discovery but as a matter of liability. So if there are tens of thousands of these suits, it does seem to raise the very floodgates argument that courts have found persuasive in the past. MR. RICH: Yeah, I would agree with all of that, Your Honor, except to the extent that all of these consumers, including my client, have independent claims against Gemini that have nothing to do with Genesis. And so THE COURT: But that's what indemnification is. You say they have nothing to do with the debtors. But Gemini, who you're suing, says it has everything to do with the debtors and they cite to Paragraph 22(b) of the

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23-10063-shl Doc 1022 Filed 12/05/23 Entered 12/05/23 08:39:25 Main Document Pg 33 of 51 Page 33 1 agreement. So again, I'm not here to decide whether they're 2 right or they're not right. But looking at the 3 indemnification clause, it presents a nonfrivolous basis to say that that there's an indemnification possibility. 4 5 so I'm not deciding that. I can't -- obviously, it's not 6 my role to decide it, but it is my role to look at it and to 7 give it a little bit of a stress test. 8 MR. RICH: Correct. 9 THE COURT: And frankly, it seems to pass the 10 stress test. 11 MR. RICH: So I would -- I agree with the language 12 of the indemnity provision, Your Honor. I disagree that it 13 passes the stress test unless and until there is a judgment. 14 So, Your Honor, if Gemini wanted to assert a claim against 15 Genesis or Genesis wanted to assert a claim against 16 indemnity against Gemini, then they could have done that. 17 THE COURT: But then they're letting somebody else 18 litigate a lawsuit that they may be on the hook for 19 ultimately because of the indemnification clause.

> MR. RICH: Correct. But none of this has occurred and there's not a judgment where a claim has accrued.

> THE COURT: Yeah. But the problem is that when there's a judgment, the debtors will say, well, it's too late, right? So it's essentially a lawsuit against us where we're not going to participate. And then Gemini has told us

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that they're going to assert indemnification.

MR. RICH: And, Your Honor, I think that's the point where Genesis would be able to come to this Court jurisdictionally and ask the Court to help them.

THE COURT: But is it? Because if that's the case, there's an adjudication on some issues, not on the issue of indemnification necessarily, but an adjudication on other issues that Gemini will rely upon to say the indemnity clause is triggered. And the question of what's collaterally estopped, either a matter of claim preclusion or issue preclusion, it can be a bit of a thicket at times and the parties' papers don't address that in that kind of detail. And I can understand why, because it's very difficult to predict how these things are going to work.

MR. RICH: Yes, Your Honor. I don't agree that they would be collaterally estopped in any of those situations. That would be non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel. I think the issues we establish in our arbitration are limited to our arbitration. And what I would say is -- I'm not asking the Court today, Your Honor, Judge Lane, I'm not asking you -- I'm not asking Your Honor to rule against them. What we're asking is that we think these issues should be decided by the arbitrator. There are going to be thousands of these cases and each of them, whether or not Gemini, a non-debtor, is entitled to a stay.

And our arbitrator, I want to be clear because this is a point of contention that has bothered me and I'm just being honest with the Court. Our arbitrator gave Gemini the opportunity to come to court as a non-debtor and ask this Court to give it some relief. And Gemini didn't do that.

Genesis, the debtor --

THE COURT: So let me read from a decision in 2014 from Judge Keenan in the district court. And I'll give you the cite. It's 2014 US District Lexis 136152. He's confronted with an issue about discovery in the case. And he says the automatic stay does not prevent litigants from obtaining discovery from a debtor as a third-party witness where requests pertain to claims against non-debtor parties. And he cites In Re Residential Capital. But then he goes on to say in situations where third-party discovery of a debtor could burden the bankruptcy proceeding, courts have generally placed the onus on the debtor to seek injunctive relief rather than requiring the party requesting discovery to obtain a lift of the automatic step.

And so he's trying to place the burden on the right party to do the right thing. And here, the debtors have done exactly that. They said it's going to impact us. So to the extent it's going to impact us, we need to, we have the burden, as Judge Keenan recognized to seek injunctive relief and that's, that's what we've done. And

then Judge Keenan goes on to say, in fact, Section 105 provides bankruptcy court with discretion to extend the automatic stay beyond the scopes of 362(a) where necessary appropriate to prevent significant interference with the bankruptcy proceeding.

And so based on that decision and other things

I've seen, I think the debtors have acted appropriately here

because it is their burden. It's not your problem

representing Mr. Asquith to say, hey, I've got to seek to

lift the stay. Sometimes people do that because they really

don't want to -- a bankruptcy stay makes folks nervous. But

I agree with Judge Keenan. This is the way it should work

that the debtors do have the burden of seeking injunctive

relief, but that's what they've done here by virtue of the

proceedings we have. So I'm ok with that. So the fact that

Gemini didn't do it doesn't really have any significance to

me. They're not a debtor. The debtors, they're worried

about interference with the bankruptcy case. It's a debtor

issue.

MR. RICH: Sure. So I don't -- like procedurally,

I'm okay with them having done it. I just wanted to point

out that Gemini has not state the position of the case. I

guess my overarching point here, Your Honor, is that we, we

believe, and our position is, that we would like the

individual arbitrator under the Federal Arbitration Act,

which is a federal statute, that requires the enforcement of provisions that Gemini admits are valid in contracts, we would like the arbitrator in each of those cases to individually decide whether Gemini is entitled to a stay.

If they are, they are.

THE COURT: But Gemini is not the debtor. I don't think you're listening to what Judge Keenan said. If you want a stay, it's a bankruptcy stay, right? That's what we're talking about. People can do whatever they want in the arbitration. But a debtor has the right to seek, and it's appropriate for a debtor to seek consistent with Judge Keenan's guidance, a stay in this court to say under 105, Judge, we think we're entitled to injunction/an extension of the automatic because of the burden this case will place on the estate for the reasons, the three reasons that they set forth in their papers. So I don't --

MR. RICH: I don't --

THE COURT: People could do whatever they want to do in arbitration. I'm not going to tell them what they can do or what they can't do. That's not my job. And so -- but I think the question for me is whether it's appropriate for me to entertain this motion. And what I'm telling you is I think it's entirely appropriate for me to entertain this motion.

MR. RICH: I don't disagree that it's appropriate

for the Court to entertain it. I just don't believe that they're entitled to the relief. If I look at the standard for the exceptions for a non-debtor to obtain some relief from the automatic stay, the only potential argument that I believe that they have here is that there's an identity of interest between the parties. And I don't see how they meet the test.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. RICH: So it's not simply a matter of, Your Honor, Judge Lane, I don't think it's simply a matter of, you know, whether or not, you know, they properly brought this. Number one, I don't think they meet the standard. Number two, I think under the FAA, under the Federal Arbitration Act, this is an issue of arbitrability that needs to be decided by the arbitrator in each case whether or not they, in fact, need discovery. Because in our case against Gemini, we have independent claims. And all of the information that we need, Your Honor, is in the possession of Gemini. We don't need anything from Genesis. Gemini doesn't need anything from Genesis. We would waive the right -- right now, we would just say whatever you have, we'll take.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, counsel?

MR. RICH: No, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Mr. Barefoot,

anything in reply briefly?

MR. BAREFOOT: Very briefly, Your Honor. I just point out in terms of counsel's suggestion that it should be decided by the arbitrator, Gemini did originally make the request for the stay to the arbitrator. And the arbitrator, of course, could have just decided that. Instead the arbitrator directed seeking guidance from this Court. And said that in the absence of an order from this Court staying arbitration, there would not be a stay, which is what prompted our motion.

Otherwise, Your Honor, I would also note that in terms of Gemini asserting an indemnification claim, Gemini's proofs of claim against the debtors do assert rights under the indemnification provisions of the master loan agreement as contingent claims. And if the arbitration were permitted to go forward and resulted in a judgment, that claim would likely no longer be contingent. I think otherwise, Your Honor, as you said, our papers make clear that we're well within the sets of circumstances where these motions are granted and would request entry of the order.

THE COURT: All right. So I think I failed to give you all the name of the case that Judge Keenan's quote was from. So my apologies for that. It's Le Metier Beauty Investment Partners LLC versus Metier Tribeca LLC. So it's a case decided September 25, 2014. So I just wanted to let

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So Judge Keenan lays out the standard and the standard -- his decision, I think, is noteworthy and a worthy place to start because it talks about who has the burden to do what in circumstances like this. And I'm not going to tell an arbitrator what to do. That's not my job. And so I -- and I certainly understand an arbitrator saying I am not a bankruptcy person and I will let the bankruptcy court do what the bankruptcy court needs to do. So I think that mutual respect is appropriate. And I can understand why the arbitrator would send it here. And frankly, the issue -- while I appreciate everybody being concerned about burdening the Court -- and certainly is a question about what's appropriate for Gemini. And that was the way it was sort of phrased by defendant's counsel and Gemini, what it can do or can't do. Both of those missed the point. The point is the impact on the estate and the impact on the reorganization. That's what the cases recognized.

So Judge Keenan segues from the who has the burden to do this. And after deciding that the debtor does, he talks about the ability to extend the scope of the automatic stay. And alternatively, you could frame it as getting injunctive relief, which is, I think how it's framed in the papers here, where necessary or appropriate to prevent significant interference with the bankruptcy proceeding.

And so -- and again, it's citing In Re Residential Capital, 480 B.R. at 536. So here, the debtors have cited three main reasons. They say that the debtor is obligated to indemnify Gemini for its liabilities, losses, costs, damages, and expenses or cause of action arising for any breach by GGC under the Gemini master loan agreement. And it cites Section 22(b) of the agreement. I've looked at Section 22(b). It's pretty straightforward. It basically says borrower hereby agrees to indemnify defend, and hold harmless lender, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera from and against all liabilities to the extent of rising out of or relating to any claim by any third-party based on arising out of or relating to borrowers' breach regarding its representations, warranties, or obligations set forth in this agreement.

And so there's caveat at the end that nobody cited. And so therefore, I don't know that it's relevant to anything we're discussing. So that's a pretty straightforward indemnification clause. And I don't see any limiting principles in it that would allow me to navigate in the way I think defendant's counsel is suggesting so that we don't have the concerns of that burden to the estate.

And so with that, what does burden mean and what do the cases say about it when looking at extending an automatic stay or granting an injunction? And so courts, in

fact, have extended the automatic stay to a non-debtor where an obligation of the debtor to indemnify the non-debtor on the existence of a finite amount of insurance, for example, available to cover such obligations exists. And that's cited to, much cited to, AH Robins Company versus Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1007-08 (4th Circuit 1986) that extends the stay to a non-debtor based on an indemnification clause.

In addition to that, there's a well-established case law that says bankruptcy courts have extended the stay to non-debtor parties if the claims in question threaten to thwart or frustrate the debtors' reorganization efforts and the injunction is important for effective reorganization.

See example In Re The 1031 Tax Group LLC, 397 B.R. 670, 684 (Bankruptcy Southern District of New York 200) as well as Hawaii Structural Iron Workers Pension Trust Fund versus Calpine Corporation, 2006 WL 3755175. It's \*4 Southern District of New York, December 20th, 2006.

So what those cases look at is the potential to impact the case. So here, there is a serious concern from indemnification we've already discussed, but also from having to participate in the proceedings. And since there is an indemnification clause, the ability of the debtors to "sit this one out" is exceedingly limited and, in fact, maybe nonexistent. Nobody has given me a precise parsing of issue preclusion and claim preclusion, but to the extent

that the arbitration may decide things that the debtor will then be presented with and have to address for purposes of dealing with a claim of indemnification, I don't think anybody can speak with certainty as to exactly how that will be parsed out.

And, frankly, you have a problem for the debtor in terms of burden even if you put aside the indemnification clause, because you have to, the debtors will likely get pulled in for discovery in terms of documents, depositions. And no matter what Mr. Asquith agrees to in this case, everyone agrees that there -- and I believe the quote was tens of thousands of consumers who have potential lawsuits, claims, arbitrations. Some of them have been stayed, it sounds like. But if this case goes forward, it will be very hard to make an argument that those cases, which are similarly situated, should not go forward as well. And then the debtor will have to participate in those cases or certainly at the very minimum, evaluate each of those cases on a case-by-case basis to determine what it needs to do or not do. And that's clearly a burden on the estate and with the tens of thousands of consumers out there, it's a potentially huge burden.

This is not uncommon in large mega Chapter 11 cases. And that's why the automatic stay exists. And that's why motions to extend the automatic stay are

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sometimes filed in circumstances where the debtor will indirectly be burdened.

The other thing that's noteworthy is Mr. Barefoot mentioned that some of those claims for indemnification will no longer be contingent. They will be now very much real and ready to go. And that will allow claimants to essentially advance their claims beyond where they existed as of the time of the filing. And to the extent that impacts other claimants, it means that those claimants whose claims now go from being contingent to being noncontingent, have improved their lot in life and their status, which is always a concern in bankruptcy and that's what the automatic stay is supposed to avoid.

So I agree that the three reasons that are identified by the debtors are a concern: the indemnification issue, the continuation of the arbitration in terms of distraction and undue burdens, and three, the continuation of the arbitration threatening the debtor's ability to effectively defend themselves in connection with suits brought by potentially tens of thousands of consumers.

And so -- and I'll end where we started, which is the automatic stay is not (indiscernible). It's not without date. It is significant for purposes of this case that we have a confirmation date in February, February 14th through 16th. No one has an ability to see into the future as to

whether that will actually happen. If I could predict such things, I no doubt would be -- my whole life would be better.

But we have made significant progress. This case has been pending for some time. And my thought is that I'm going to deny this motion. If the confirmation hearing doesn't go forward at that time, and the case is not progressing and something else happens, it takes a significant left turn, you know, Mr. Asquith can come back. But given that I've made a ruling on the motion, the reasons for my ruling still apply. So I'm not -- since I've made a ruling as opposed to parties reaching an agreement, I'm not going to undo my ruling. Now, hold on one minute.

All right. So I'm sorry, I'm granting the motion. So since I've made a ruling on the motion -- it was just pointed out that I've used the exact wrong term -- I'm granting the motion. But since I've made a ruling, it's not a matter of negotiation. So if those factors still apply, then my ruling will be the same. So what I'm trying to do though is be fair and clear to everybody. So certainly I encourage the debtors to keep Mr. Asquith, you know, answer his call in February if he has a question about where things stand. But if those same factors apply, they still apply. And I just don't want to see a floodgate of additional motion papers that essentially say, well, the calendar has

turned to February, so it's a brand new ball game. It's not. I made a ruling. The ruling is the ruling. But again, I can't predict the future and see where we are. So if events significantly change, then we'll see where we are.

MR. RICH: Thank you, Your Honor. May I ask a question for purposes of the record on appeal. Is the Court ruling that any arbitration by a consumer against Gemini --

THE COURT: No, I have this -- I have you and I have the debtors in front of me in this adversary proceeding, this motion. So I'm making a ruling on this motion. What I am considering is the fact that both you and Mr. Barefoot cited that there are tens of thousands of consumers out there who exist. And you said you didn't think this would be the first or last of these motions that I would see or concerns that I would see. And I think that is relevant for purposes of determining the potential burden on the estate.

MR. RICH: Well so it seems to me do I need to come back to this Court in each of the arbitrations that exists? I guess that's where I'm going. Is this ruling --

THE COURT: I'm not in a position to give you an advisory ruling. You have the ruling. You understand what the basis of it is and what law it's based on and what facts it's based on. And so I certainly would encourage you not to waste anybody's time by presenting an application that

raises the exact issues that I've ruled on because you're likely then to get a ruling that says for the same reason set forth in the Court's bench ruling of X date, I conclude the following. But again, I can't predict the future. And I don't know the circumstances that we'll find ourselves in a month, two months, three months from now. But I certainly trust counsel, who is evaluating each of the cases that they're involved in, will look at my ruling and determine how they want to proceed in the future.

MR. RICH: Well I understand that Your Honor.

That's why I was asking because it seems like the logic that you've applied, applies to the arbitration agreement of every consumer, not just Mr. Asquith.

THE COURT: Counsel, I can't say anything more to you than I already have. So that's certainly why I started to try to see if we could work something out. But I've made a ruling. Once I make a ruling, I make a rule. So it is what it is at that point.

So what I'd ask is if the debtors would submit a proposed order that states the motion is granted for the recent set forth on the record here today. And to the extent there's going to be an appeal, which is obviously your right, I'd ask that the parties submit a transcript so I can at least look at it and make sure it's clean and understandable and obviously because it's a bench ruling, I

Page 48 retain editorial control. But certainly, I promise not to spring a whole brand new issue or theory on you. But again, my purpose is to make sure it's clear. And as we all know, transcripts are usually quite good, but occasionally there's an issue where they're a little hard to comprehend. So that's the point of my request just so that it's clear and everybody knows what the ruling is and then you can all not be burdened by any confusion on that score if you have proceedings elsewhere. All right. So Mr. Barefoot, anything else from you? MR. BAREFOOT: No, Your Honor, we will submit a proposed order and we'll certainly submit the transcript as well. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. let me ask defense counsel, anything else from you, counsel? MR. RICH: No, Your Honor. Thank you, Judge Lane. THE COURT: All right. Again, I appreciate your concern and your zealous advocacy for your client. MR. RICH: Thank you. THE COURT: And I ow you, if you've spent any time in this case listening to hearings, you know that there are a lot of customers who have a lot of things they're concerned about and issues they want addressed. And we're

trying to do that here in the context of the case in a

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Page 49 1 collective manner. And hopefully, the progress that we've 2 been making will continue to make progress and I think 3 that's for the betterment of everybody. So fingers crossed. MR. RICH: Thank you, Your Honor. And thank you, 4 5 Mr. Barefoot. And, Your Honor, it's not personal. You know 6 this is my -- my job is to advocate, so I hope you know 7 that's why I'm here. THE COURT: No, no. I totally get it. 8 I totally 9 I do remember being a lawyer and having clients and 10 I appreciate your zealous advocacy. 11 MR. RICH: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Barefoot, anything 13 else that we have on for today? 14 MR. BAREFOOT: No, Your Honor. That concludes our 15 All right. Thank you very much. Thank you to 16 everybody for being here. And, Mr. Barefoot, I figured I 17 would just briefly ask you and I know if Ms. Eubanks were 18 here, she could straighten me out, but I'm just trying to 19 get a sense of what's coming up in the near term in the case 20 when we're next together. 21 MR. BAREFOOT: We're together next, Your Honor, on 22 December 13th. 23 THE COURT: All right. Anything worth talking 24 about in terms of a preview as to the amount of time you

might need or anything in that score? Or is it premature to

Page 50 1 speak on those matters? 2 MR. BAREFOOT: I think it would be premature, Your 3 Honor. The objection deadlines haven't really passed. So 4 I'm not clear at this point on what the scope of contested 5 matters is going to be. 6 THE COURT: All right, fair enough. With that, 7 thank you very much. Be well and see you in a couple of 8 weeks. 9 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 10 12:16 PM) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 51 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 Songa M. deslarski Hydl 6 7 8 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Veritext Legal Solutions 20 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 Mineola, NY 11501 23 24 25 Date: December 4, 2023